The [weakness](http://ohuiginn.net/mt/2009/04/market_socialism.html) of the left’s response to the financial crisis is also noticeable here in Germany. Left-wing parties are somehow managing to
lose
popularity, even as capitalism collapses around them. Even Attac — the group campaigning for a [Tobin Tax](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobin_tax), and generally among the better-informed critics of unfettered free markets — have failed to make a dent in the debate. [Der Spiegel](http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,618304,00.html) nails one reason – the left’s certainty of itself, regardless of the rest of the world:
>Those who know they are always right can deal less with a specific moment than with their principles. So they miss the forward-pass from history, the breath of the moment.
>Thus the clear weakness of the left is not least their inability to react adequately to this unique historical moment, which is for many as confusing as it is threatening.
>That has always been the power of a successful protest movement: vocalising the situation in order to change it. Tangibly, surprisingly. It happened in 1968. It happened in the 1970s, with the environmental and anti-nuclear movements. It happened in 1989, as the wall fell. Always the expression of suppressed or displaced feelings played a decisive role – wit, verve, impudence, passion and a touch of genius, brought together for a ‘concrete utopia’ [all very loosely translated]
Debt
[John Gray](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22556) likes Margaret Atwood’s new (non-fiction) book on debt:
Atwood’s project is to show how human thought has been deeply shaped by notions of debt. It will be objected that she is merely spinning out an extended metaphor suggesting analogies between debt and noneconomic phenomena that are only vaguely analogous. In fact she is advancing the contrary and more interesting claim that economic activities involving borrowing and lending are metaphorical extensions of an underlying human sense of indebtedness. Beliefs about debt are not shadows cast by processes of market exchange. They are presupposed throughout much of human activity. Economic life invokes a sense of order in human affairs, widely dispersed throughout society.
Can a recession help Russia?
Tyler Cowen, of [Marginal Revolution](http://www.marginalrevolution.com/) has an [excellent article](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=517090) arguing that the United States, despite being the epicentre of the financial crisis, will probably survive it better than many other countries:
>Its size is one reason why the United States has such a robust polity and economy. In bad times, international cooperation tends to break down, which increases the relative influence of larger economic and political units. Smaller countries, such as Belgium, are generally more dependent on international trade than the United States. And in truly dire situations, military power counts for more—and the United States accounts for almost half of the world’s defense spending.
Going by these reasons (Tyler has others which don’t apply), you might think Russia is also in a good position. Small CIS countries which had gambled on free markets — Georgia, Estonia — will end up in hard times as falling demand cuts them off from foreign markets, while the Russian military has not lost its ability to dominate them. Russia, its stock market relatively insignificant, is also insulated from the financial downturn, except insofar as it affects energy prices. Hardline Russia-fearers such as [Edward “New Cold War” Lucas](http://edwardlucas.blogspot.com/) will still be able to terrify us with tales of Kremlin power-games in the coming years.
I generally buy that narrative. But in the other side of the balance is the hint that [Russia will continue to be a whipping-boy](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav040809a.shtml) for its neighbours:
>As its economy sinks and social tensions portend a summer of discontent, several mass media outlets in Tajikistan are busy identifying culprits for the Central Asian nation’s problems. By all appearances, the chief scapegoat is shaping up to be Russia. Local newspapers recently have blamed the Kremlin for everything from stoking the 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan to drug trafficking, economic woes and even a possible future coup d’etat
I wouldn’t suggest this as marking a larger trend, given that Europe and the EU are equally plausible scapegoats for Central Asia. But if economic hardship encourages xenophobia (and it often does) then the easiest targets are expatriate workers. In Central Asia, that mainly means Russians, and to a lesser extent Chinese. They could well find themselves in awkward position, even if Russia turns out to be, like the US, a ‘counter-cyclical asset’.
Heading West
I’ve just noticed the main section headings at the top of the Guardian website:
* UK
* World
* United States
...
yes, the US gets its own section rather than being crammed in with the rest of the ‘world’. There’s no separate top-level section for Europe.
I wonder if it’s because they get a lot of USian readers online, or because nobody has yet managed to get the British interested in Europe.
Protected: [angst] visitors
More on characters
On that [debate](http://ohuiginn.net/mt/2009/04/character_assassination.html) about China returning to traditional characters: [Xinhua says no](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/09/content_11157349.htm). And goes further:
>For the first time in nearly 20 years, China will issue a modified list of simplified Chinese characters in an effort to further standardize a language used by billions around the world.
Georgia protests: Friday
This probably won’t be as detailed as [yesterday](http://ohuiginn.net/mt/2009/04/georgia_protests_in_detail.html#comments)’s blogging, but I’ll try to keep an eye on what’s happening in Tbilisi today.
Friday 1300: Overnight, a [few hundred](http://twitter.com/CivilGe/status/1486048262) protesters maintained a vigil outside the parliament, [blocking](http://www.pr-inside.com/georgian-protest-stretches-into-second-r1175852.htm) the street there ((http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20700)). Saakashvili was [scheduled](http://twitter.com/govtofgeorgia/status/1489227970) to give a speech at 1200; he [refused to step down](http://en.rian.ru/world/20090410/121048791.html), and [called](http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5390P320090410) for ‘dialogue and sharing responsibility’. [Extracts here](http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20699). The opposition have [demanded](http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-04-10/Countdown_for_Saakashvili_begins_.html) Saakashvili’s resignation before 1600.
1630: [Plans](http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20704) to hold riots in more areas around Tbilisi. Saakashvili [proposes](http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20702) direct election of mayor of Tbilisi. [Shevardnadze](http://news-en.trend.az/politics/foreign/1454067.html): “
constructive dialogue between the authorities and opposition is impossible
”
1900: [some leaders](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7993844.stm) call for civil disobedience . [More claims](http://twitter.com/dv0rsky/statuses/1490352230) of roads into Tbilisi being blocked. [Russia](http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20683) increasing troop levels in Abkhazia? Gacheciladze, Burjanadze and others [repeat](http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20705) calls for Saakashvili to stand down
2000: The opposition groups seem to be splitting up, physically and tactically. At least Levan Gachicheladze and Kakha Kukava (Conservative) are calling for disobedience (without violence – they seem to mean blocking the roads) – see [Telegraph](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/5137060/Georgia-protesters-plan-disobedience-campaign.html), [Mosnews](http://www.mosnews.com/politics/2009/04/10/964/), [RIA-Novosti](http://en.rian.ru/world/20090410/121057277.html). Nino Burjanadze [wants](http://www.mosnews.com/politics/2009/04/10/964//lev) to debate Saakashvili live on television.
Sat 0100: Opposition plan [daily blockades](http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav041009c.shtml) outside parliament, the presidential residence and the public broadcaster, 3-9 pm. Seeming difference between the protest leaders: Irakli Alasania (former UN ambassador, most popular of the protest leaders) and Nino Burjanadze are calling for dialogue, Levan Gacheciladze and Salome Zourabichvili focus on direct action.
Summary of Thursday: ~50,000 people on almost entirely peaceful protests ([GIPA](http://caucasusreports.wordpress.com/2009/04/10/april-9-protests-the-day-after-coverage/) and [RFE/RL](http://www.rferl.org/content/Youth_Activist_Severely_Beaten_During_Georgia_Protests/1606145.html) [report](http://caucasusreports.wordpress.com/2009/04/10/3-activists-beaten-by-masked-men/) some exceptions). ‘Wu Wei’ [writes](http://kosmyryk.typepad.com/wu_wei/2009/04/april-9-demonstration-tbilisi.html):
>Our local staff came in this morning with reports that the Opposition was really badly funded compared with previously (from Patarkatsishvili), whereas the Government was really well organised. The Opposition had only paper banners, no free food was provided to keep people there, whereas the government had rounded up a load of taxis and paid them to take people away.
Hostages in France
Sarkozy is feeling [helpless]() about the current French fad of workers holding their bosses hostage as part of protests:
>”What’s this about holding people captive? We have the rule of law in this country. I will not let such things happen,” Sarkozy told a group of entrepreneurs on Tuesday.
>The same day, workers at a British-owned plant detained four managers, including three Britons, and held them overnight.
This is the same Sarkozy who first gained national attention by personally wading in to rescue hostages. Perhaps he should put together a personal SWAT team and embark on a ‘save capitalists’ tour of the country.
Apparently 45% of the French consider kidnapping an acceptable tactic in workers’ disputes. I kind of agree, as long as it’s on the level of ‘inconvenience the boss for a couple of days’, rather than ‘lock somebody in a cell for years, and demand ransom’. But perhaps I should learn to keep my petulant side in check.
Untitled
“Only 53% of American adults believe capitalism is better than socialism.”(source)
Also: “Adults under 30 are essentially evenly divided: 37% prefer capitalism, 33% socialism, and 30% are undecided”
Unrelatedly, Jenny Holzer is on twitter – perhaps the one celebrity who should be. [don’t know who Jenny Holzer is? Read her inflammatory essays]. Now we just need to get Abdal-Hakim Murad on there too, and the thing starts to have a purpose.
Some questions about the Georgian protests
Obviously, I’m following today’s [protests in Georgia](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7991026.stm) with interest. Not being there, it’s hard to get a feeling for what’s going on. I have no answers, but here are some of the questions forming in my head:
Is the country behind the protesters?
Most of the reporting I’ve seen concentrates on the political elites: the opposition leaders themselves, their key supporters, and the wonkish community of diplomats, NGO workers and the like. It’s hard to tell how much resonance their demands have with the rest of the country. naturally, they can demonstrate this by bringing a lot of people onto the streets.
Do they want the country?
Look at the demands. More power for the judiciary, respect for private property, a moderate line on Russia. Will Georgians support this? Sure, many will. But where is the talk about jobs, pensions, the cost of living – the kind of things you would raise to build a mass movement? Rather, the demands seem perfectly tuned to appeal to the world outside Georgia – the governments, the NGOs, the military concerned after last year’s war.
What about the world?
So, if the opposition care about outside support, will they be getting it? Here, they’re doing a decen job. [Salome Zourabichvili’s op-ed](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/opinion/04iht-edzourabichvili.html?_r=2) in the New York Times last week lays out the stall for the American policy community. Nino Burjanadze was last year already doing the rounds of Washington wonks. Now the US is being [very supportive](http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10970&Itemid=133) of the demonstrators.
Politics, or Geopolitics?
The question of whether the demonstrators are counting on internal or external support can be rephrased: does politics matter? I usually believe it does. The balance of power in Tbilisi right now, for instance, depends very much on the peopel involved. But there’s an altenative, geopolitical take on this in which Georgia is just a pawn on the grand chessboard of power politics. So the US and Europe want Saakashvili out because he is likely to weaken Georgia – and hence American influence – by giving Russia an excuse to invade. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (briefly shut down by Russia during last year’s war) would doubtless also come into play. Personally, I don’t buy it. Foreign
acceptance
of the possibility of a putsch is crucial – had the US hinted it would step in and defend the elected Georgian government, Saakashvili would be sleeping easier. But foreign pressure to overthrow the government? I don’t think any major power, Russia aside, cares enough about Georgia to dabble like that.
What about Moldova?
[Nathan](http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/04/08/manna-from-the-blogosphere/) writes that “
the interesting question will be how and whether events in Chisinau shape those in Tbilisi
“. Which is a
very
interesting question. Superficially, they’re both quite inward-looking protests. For instance, I don’t think either of them have much connection to the financial crisis. It’s tempting to fit them into a narrative of ex-Soviet modernisers unhappy with losing elections. Surely some of the demonstrators and parts of the media will put things in those terms. I don’t think it would be true — but truth isn’t what matters, at times like these.
More of this to follow later in the day, if time allows